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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT DUE PRO-
CESS - REPRESENTATION BY COUNSEL AT TRIAL Is A PREREQUISITE
TO THE IMPOSITION OF ANY SENTENCE OF IMPRISONMENT ABSENT
VALID WAIVER.
Argersinger v. Hamlin (U.S. 1972)
Petitioner was arrested for carrying a concealed weapon' in violation
of a Florida criminal statute.2 He pleaded guilty and was ordered to pay
a fine and, upon default of such payment, to be imprisoned at hard labor
in the county jail for three months.3 Through an attorney, petitioner filed
an application for a writ of habeas corpus in the Florida Supreme Court,
alleging that at the time of his conviction: (1) he was an indigent un-
represented by counsel; (2) he had not waived the assistance of counsel;
and (3) he had a defense to the charge which he, as a layman, could not
properly raise and present.4 The Florida Supreme Court, in a four-to-
three decision, discharged the application, holding that the right to appointed
counsel, by analogy to the right to demand a jury trial, was limited to
situations in which the offense charged carried a possible sentence of
more than six months imprisonment. 5 The United States Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
requires that a defendant be represented at trial, regardless of the offense
charged, and that absent a proper waiver, such representation is a pre-
requisite to the imposition of imprisonment. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407
U.S. 25 (1972).
The sixth amendment to the Constitution, which directly governs
federal criminal proceedings, provides, inter alia, that "in all criminal prose-
cutions, the accused shall have the right .. . to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his Defence." In Johnson v. Zerbst,7 the Court held that the
sixth amendment gave an indigent tried in federal court the right to be
provided with counsel at government expense. While Johnson involved
1. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 1, Argersinger v. Hamlin,
407 U.S. 25 (1972).
2. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.01(1) (1965). The statute authorizes either im-
prisonment for three to six months, or a fine of $500 to $1000, or both.
3. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 2, Argersinger v. Hamlin,
407 U.S. 25 (1972).
4. Id.
5. State ex rel. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 236 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1970). See notes
34-36 and accompanying text infra. Under this ruling petitioner had no right to
appointed counsel since the maximum sentence was not more than six months. See
note 2 supra.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
7. 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938).
(750)
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a felony conviction, at least one federal court applied the same prin-
ciple to misdemeanors, finding no constitutional significance in the length
of the sentence imposed.8
With respect to appointed counsel in state court proceedings, the
issue was more complex, since the sixth amendment did not apply prima
facie to the states. In Powell v. Alabama,9 the Court held that an indigent 0
defendant in a state prosecution had such a right based on the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment." However, while the Court spoke
eloquently and expansively of the need for counsel in any criminal case,12
the decision, on its own terms, was limited to capital cases in which the
defendant is incapable of defending himself due to illiteracy or deficient
mental capacity. 13 Some later cases contained language asserting an absolute
right to appointed counsel in state capital cases, 14 and, finally, such a rule
was established by implication'3 in Hamilton v. Alabama.16
When dealing with a state noncapital felony case, the Court in Betts
v. Brady17 noted that a review of the historical data revealed only that the
Constitution allowed a defendant to appear by counsel, not that it man-
dated appointment of counsel for indigents. Moreover, the positions of
the various states on the question demonstrated that the appointment of
counsel was not essential for the maintenance of a fair trial.' 8 For these
8. Evans v. Rives, 126 F.2d 633, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
9. 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932).
10. Although the term "indigent" in this context refers to someone who is finan-
cially unable to afford counsel, both the agency responsible for determining indigency
and the standards for making that determination vary from state to state and even
from county to county within a state. See L. SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN
CRIMINAL CASES IN AMERICAN STATE COURTS 103-18 (1965). In the federal system,
the court is required to conduct "appropriate inquiry" to determine whether the
defendant is financially unable to obtain counsel. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (b) (1970).
However, no standards for such determination are included in the statute.
11. The existence of a right to counsel provision was of no direct aid to the
Powell Court in reaching this conclusion. It was, in fact, somewhat of a hindrance
because of the language in Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 534-35 (1884), to
the effect that any provision of the Bill of Rights which was not included in the
fourteenth amendment was specifically excluded from that amendment. The Court in
Powell, however, concluded that Hurtado provided only an aid to construction and
that its reasoning must yield when the right involved is so fundamental in character
that denial would violate basic concepts of liberty and justice. 287 U.S. at 67-68.
12. The Court noted that:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not include
the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has
small and sometimes no skill in the science of law .... He lacks both the skill
and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect
one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings
against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of convic-
tion because he does not know how to establish his innocence.
287 U.S. at 68-69.
13. Id. at 71.
14. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 350-51 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring),
citing Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437, 441 (1948) ; Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S.
640, 674 (1948) ; Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 445 (1940).
15. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 350-51 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring).
16. 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
17. 316 U.S. 455, 466 (1942). The historical data consisted of the constitutions
of the thirteen original states, read in light of the English common law tradition. Id.
18. Id. at 469-71.
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reasons, the Court held that the fourteenth amendment guarantee of due.
process of law did not require appointment of counsel in all noncapital
felony cases.' 9 The rule articulated in Betts, known as the "special circum-
stances" rule,20 soon evaporated as the courts began to "find" such "special
circumstances" in every case in which the question arose, notwithstanding
the differing factual situations.2 '
In 1963, on facts quite similar to those in Betts, the Court in Gideon
v. Wainwright22  specifically overruled Betts, holding that the sixth
amendment guarantee of assistance of counsel applied to the states through
the fourteenth amendment, and, therefore the appointment of counsel for
indigents was required. Although the Court's opinion made no reference to
the offense charged and spoke of all persons who are too poor to hire a
lawyer,23. the case involved a felony conviction and, arguably, could be
read narrowly as not being applicable to misdemeanor cases.2 4 Such a
narrow construction seemed to be favored when, in Mempa v. Rhay,25
the Court referred to Gideon as establishing an absolute right to counsel
in felony cases.
In the aftermath of Gideon, the law concerning an indigent's right to
appointed counsel in a state misdemeanor prosecution has been in a con-
fused state.2 6 In interpreting Gideon, some state courts, focusing on the
fact that the case involved a felony conviction, held that there was no
constitutional right to appointed counsel for indigent misdemeanants. 2 7
Other courts, finding significance in the broad language of the Gideon
opinion, held that all indigent misdemeanants must be afforded appointed
counsel.28  Still other courts adopted a "middle of the road position,"
namely, that counsel need be appointed only in felony and "serious" mis-
19. Id. at 473.
20. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 350-51 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring).
It should be noted that the Betts opinion did not use the term "special circumstances."
However, later cases referred to the Betts rule as the "special circumstances" rule. Id.
21. Id. It should be noted that the Betts Court was silent on exactly what type of
case required appointment of counsel. The Court merely noted that it was not
required in all noncapital felony cases. 316 U.S. at 473.
22. 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963).
23. Id. at 344.
24. See, e.g., Cortinez v. Flournoy, 249 La. 741, 190 So. 2d 909, cert. denied,385 U.S. 925 (1966). In the same year as Gideon, the Supreme Court vacated and
remanded a misdemeanor conviction for further consideration in light of Gideon.Patterson v. Maryland, 372 U.S. 776 (1963). However, the sentence imposed was
two years, and the lower court decision was based on whether that sentence made the
case sufficiently "serious" to require appointment of counsel. Patterson v. State, 227Md. 194, 196, 175 A.2d 746, 748 (1961). This led at least one court to conclude thatGideon required appointment of counsel in felony and "serious" misdemeanor cases.
State v. Anderson, 96 Ariz. 123, 392 P.2d 284 (1964).
25. 389 U.S. 128, 134 (1967).
26. See Junker, The Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases, 43 WASH. L. REV.
685 (1968). See also Comment, Right to Counsel: The Impact of Gideon v. Wain-
right in the Fifty States, 3 CREIGHTON L. REV. 103 (1970).
27. See, e.g., City of Toledo v. Frazier, 10 Ohio App. 2d 51, 226 N.E.2d 777(1967).
28. See, e.g., Tacoma v. Heater, 67 Wash. 2d 786, 409 P.2d 867 (1966).
S[VOL. 18
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demeanor cases.2 9 Despite these conflicting views, the Supreme Court
denied certiorari in three cases which presented the issue of constitutionally
required counsel for indigent misdemeanants8 0 The constitutional mandate
of due process of law had not only come to mean "one thing in Arkansas
and something else in Mississippi,"'' s but it also had come to mean different
things to different courts within the same state.8 2
Against this background of confusion, the Argersinger Court's holding
is commendably clear:
We hold . . . that absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person
may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, mis-
demeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial.88
In arriving at this rule, the Argersinger Court rejected the Florida
Supreme Court's holding3 4 that, if the right to appointed counsel was to
apply to any crimes other than felonies, it should extend only to crimes
which carry a maximum sentence of more than six months imprisonment. 85
The Florida court had reasoned that since both the right to counsel and
the right to demand a jury trial are enumerated in the sixth amendment, the
six month sentence limitation which applies to the right to demand a jury
trial should also apply to the right to appointed counsel.8 6 The Argersinger
Court rejected this interpretation by noting that other rights enumerated
in that amendment, such as the right to have a public trial, 7 to confront
the state's witnesses,88 and to have compulsory process for defense wit-
nesses,8 9 are not subject to any limitation based on the offense charged.4 0
The Court then stressed that the six month sentence limitation was
appropriate for the right to demand a jury trial since historically that
29. See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 96 Ariz. 123, 392 P.2d 784 (1964). See note 24
supr-a.
30. Dejoseph v. Connecticut, 385 U.S. 982 (1966); Cortinez v. Flournoy, 385
U.S. 925 (1966) ; Winters v. Beck, 385 U.S. 907 (1966).31. Winters v. Beck, 385 U.S. 907, 908 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
32. Compare Arbo v. Hegstrom, 261 F. Supp. 397 (D. Conn. 1966), where the
court held that an indigent charged with the misdemeanor of nonsupport had a con-
stitutional right to appointed counsel, with State v. DeJoseph, 3 Conn. Cir. 624, 222A.2d 752 (Cir. Ct. 1966), where the court approved a state statute giving the trial
court discretionary power to determine in which cases counsel should be appointed.
The Deloseph case involved a conviction for nonsupport and was disposed of on the
ground that the defendant had not established his indigency. Id. at 636-37, 222 A.2d
at 759-60.
33. 407 U.S. at 37.
34. Id. at 30-31.
35. The Florida Supreme Court felt it was being "coerced" into some type of
extension of the right to counsel beyond felony cases by the federal courts of the Fifth
Circuit. State ex rel. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 236 So. 2d 442, 443 (Fla. 1970).36. Id., citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1966). Duncan limited the
right to demand a jury trial to non-petty offenses. Id. at 159. In Baldwin v. NewYork, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970), a plurality of the Court expressed the opinion that
no crime which carried a sentence of more than six-months imprisonment could be
termed "petty" for purposes of determining whether there was a right to demand ajury trial.
37. 407 U.S. at 28, citing In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
38. 407 U.S. at 28, citing Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
39. 407 U.S. at 28, citing Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
40. 407 U.S. at 28.
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right had been a limited one, 4' and, more importantly, since the absence
of a jury is not constitutionally defective because there is an alternative -
trial to a judge alone - which could also provide the defendant with a
fair trial. 42 Neither of these considerations, however, were found applicable
to the right to appointed counsel. The Court noted that the right to retain
counsel for less than felony offenses was not circumscribed by any historical
limitations.48 Further, the Court found that the rationale of appointed
counsel cases, such as Powell and Gideon, showed that the absence of
counsel will often preclude the possibility of a fair trial44 and that this
fact is not altered when the crime carries a potential sentence of less than
six months imprisonment.45 In support of this proposition the Court noted
that the issues in a misdemeanor case can be complex, 46 that the advice
of counsel is necessary for a knowledgeable plea 4 7 and that the very large
number of misdemeanor cases creates a tendency to sacrifice fairness for
rapid disposition of cases. 48 For these reasons the Court determined that
the presence of counsel is a necessary ingredient of the fair trial guaranteed
by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.49
Although the Court was unanimous in reversing the conviction and
thus disavowing the rule established by the Florida Supreme Court, Justice
Powell, in an opinion joined by Justice Rehnquist, concurred only in the
result.50 Justice Powell disagreed with the majority's belief that the
Constitution required a rigid rule on the appointment of counsel. 51 He
suggested, instead, that the need for counsel be determined on a case-by-case
basis. 2 Since these two rules - one rigid, the other flexible - represent
the basic choices open to the Court in any extension of the right to
41. Id. at 29, citing Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
42. 407 U.S. at 29.
43. Id. at 30, citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60, 64-65 (1932).
44. 407 U.S. at 31.
45. Id. at 33.
46. Id., citing Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1967) ; Shuttlesworth v. Birming-
ham, 382 U.S. 87 (1965); Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960).
47. 407 U.S. at 34.
48. Id. at 34-36.
49. Id. at 36-37. The Court's opinion is unclear as to the actual constitutional
basis of the holding. On the one hand, the Syllabus of the Court and other language
in the opinion reflect the theory that the sixth amendment right to counsel provision
is applicable to the states by "incorporation" into the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 25,
37. However, the analysis of the Court focuses on the unfairness of trial without
counsel, and therefore, the rationale would seem to be based on the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. For a full discussion of the "incorporation" theory, see
Cushman, Incorporation: Due Process and the Bill of Rights, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 467(1966).
50. 407 U.S. at 44. There were two other opinions filed. Chief Justice Burger,
concurring in the result, outlined what he believed to be the proper approach for trialjudges in implementing the new rule and noted that, despite the many problems which
could arise under the rule, the legal profession had a history of meeting new burdens.
Id. at 41-44. Mr. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Douglas and Stewart, wrote
a concurring opinion stressing that law students under faculty guidance could provide
a source of legal manpower to aid in fulfilling the rule's requirements. Id. at 40-41.
51. Id. at 49.
52. Id. at 63.
[VOL. 18
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appointed counsel, a comparison and contrast of the two is most helpful
in analyzing the validity of the majority rule.
Since the purpose of each rule is to assure that no defendant in need
of an attorney will be without one, it is appropriate to determine which
rule better serves this goal. In this regard, it is submitted that the majority
rule is clearly superior to Justice Powell's suggestion. The majority rule
is basically rigid but simple - no defendant may be imprisoned unless
he was represented by counsel at his trial. Therefore, at least with respect
to convictions which result in imprisonment, all defendants will be afforded
protection. In fact, the majority rule will afford representation in cases
where the presence of an attorney is not essential to the maintenance of
a fair trial.53 However, where the very fairness of the adjudication of
guilt or innocence is concerned, rigid rules applying to all cases are most
desirable, even if the result is an overextension of the right involved. 54
In contrast, Justice Powell attacked the rigidity of the majority rule. 55
It was his position that the trial judge should make the initial determination
53. One example of such a case would be where an indigent defendant, appre-
hended by the police in flagrante delicto, wishes to plead guilty immediately. Even in
such a case, imprisonment could not be imposed unless the defendant was afforded
representation,
54. Other rights which pertain to the fairness of the trial are rigid in structure.
See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (right to a jury trial on demand
in non-petty cases) ; Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (right to have com-
pulsory process for defense witnesses) ; Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213(1967) (right to an open trial) ; Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (right to
confront prosecution witnesses); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (right to a
speedy trial).
55. 407 U.S. at 49. The sufficiency of legal manpower to discharge the duties
imposed by the Argersinger rule was another area of sharp disagreement between
the majority and Justice Powell. The majority pointed out that there are currently
over 355,000 attorneys in the country. Id. at 37 n.7, citing BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 153 (1971).
By contrasting this figure with the estimated 1,575 to 2,300 full-time attorneys needed
to represent all indigent misdemeanants, excluding traffic offenders, the majority found
no paucity of manpower to meet the requirements of its rule. 407 U.S. at 37 n.7,
citing Note, Dollars and Sense of an Expanded Right to Counsel, 55 IowA L. REV.
1249, 1260-61 (1970). Justice Powell disputed the majority figures on two grounds:(1) aggregate figures do not accurately reflect the number of attorneys who are both
capable and willing to represent criminal defendants; and (2) aggregate figures ignore
the real problem - attorneys are not evenly distributed across the country and,
therefore, many small governmental units will contain an insufficient number of
attorneys to effectuate the Argersinger rule. 407 U.S. at 56-58, 59-61.
Any discussion of the practical implications of the Argersinger rule is specu-
lative. It has been estimated that there are between four and five million misde-
meanor court cases each year (exclusive of traffic offenses). PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION
ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE
COURTS 55 (1967). However, there is simply no way of knowing how many of these
involve indigents. No reliable extrapolation from the known number of indigent
felons can be made since misdemeanor cases are usually less expensive to defend and,
thus, a smaller percentage of those involved will be unable to hire attorneys. L.
SILVERSTEIN, supra note 10, at 125. Furthermore, any estimate based on the number
of indigent felons would be on the unproven assumption that the economic status
of felons and misdemeanants is the same. Note, supra, at 1260 n.74. The estimate
of 1,575 to 2,300 attorneys necessary to represent indigent misdemeanants is based on
what is apparently a "guess" that there are 1 million to 1.25 million indigent mis-
demeanants annually. Id. at 1260.
MARCH 1973]
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of the need for counsel in each case,56 with the appellate courts reviewing
closely any decision not to provide counsel.57 If Justice Powell's rule were
a workable one, it would not only provide the requisite fair trial, but
also prevent any problems with overextension. However, it is submitted
that in actual practice his rule would not effectively guarantee representation
for all those who need it.
The first problem with Justice Powell's suggested rule is its similarity
to the "special circumstances" rule of Betts,58 which rule had to be aban-
doned when it failed to protect adequately the rights of indigent de-
fendants. 59 Justice Powell admitted the similarity but argued that the
reason for the failure of Betts - the insensitivity of state courts to the
rights of criminal defendants - can not still be presumed to exist.60
Whether or not such insensitivity still exists is, of course, a matter for
speculation, but it is significant that the only previous attempt at a case-
by-case determination of the need for appointed counsel was a failure and
had to be replaced with a rigid standard.
Secondly, appellate review is not an adequate remedy when counsel
has been denied. This is due not to the possible insensitivity of the
appellate courts, but rather to the extremely important role that the
attorney plays in making appellate review a workable remedy for any
error at trial.61
Finally, even if the defendant could be retried with counsel and with-
out prejudice from the former trial, there is a valid policy reason for avoid-
ing such a procedure. Although not constitutionally objectionable, this type
of legal "runaround" - trial without counsel, appeal, reversal, trial with
counsel - hardly seems calculated to instill in the accused misdemeanant
a sense of confidence in the criminal justice system.62
56. 407 U.S. at 63.
57. Id. at 63-64.
58. See notes 17-21 and accompanying text supra.
59. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 350-51 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring).
60. 407 U.S. at 65.
61. Chief Justice Burger has stated:
Appeal from a conviction after an uncounseled trial is not likely to be of much
help to a defendant since the die is usually cast when judgment is entered on an
uncounseled trial record.
Id. at 41. The "die is cast" for several reasons. First, the uncounseled defendant may
never come to know of any right to appeal or of the necessary procedures for per-
fecting an appeal. Second, unless Justice Powell is suggesting that all aspects of all
uncounseled trials would necessarily be reviewed, there is little likelihood that the
unrepresented defendant would know what questions to raise on appeal or how to
preserve those questions for appeal. Finally, any appeal would have to be based on
the trial record, but there is a strong probability that courtroom errors which would
not escape zealous counsel for the defense would not be ascertainable from the bare
record.
62. In assessing the importance of appointed counsel in misdemeanor cases, the
ABA has stated:
Minor offenses may have major significance in terms of the interests to be served
by providing defense services. It is at this level that the largest number of people
confront the administration of criminal justice. If they are to develop respect
for its processes it must treat them fairly; and providing counsel to those unable
to retain their own is essential to the development of that respect. Moreover,
those who are charged with major offenses often have a record of prior convic-
[VOL. 18
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In sum, Justice Powell's rule is unworkable because the legal system
functions properly - both at trial and on appeal - only when both sides
are competently represented. The majority rule, on the other hand, pro-
vides for automatic appointment of counsel and, therefore, remains within
the parameters of the adversary process.
This is not to suggest, however, that the majority rule is flawless,
but merely that it will function better than any case-by-case method in
assuring fair trials. In fact, there are two major problems with the
Argersinger ruling. First, the Court specifically left open the question
of the constitutionality of uncounseled trials which do not result in imprison-
ment.63 Therefore, defendants who are sentenced to pay a fine or to
surrender some validly bestowed privilege, such as a motor vehicle opera-
tor's license,64 are still subject to trial without appointed counsel. This
situation is disturbing since the Argersinger opinion indicated that all
uncounseled trials run grave risks of being violative of due process. 5
However, unless due process requirements vary according to the type of
punishment imposed - and there is nothing in the fourteenth amendment
which suggests this - the rule of Argersinger seems ripe for extension on
this point when a proper case is presented.
The second problem is with the practical administration of the rule.
Under the explicit holding of the Court, there is a right to representation
only if the defendant is actually given a jail sentence. Sentencing, how-
ever, comes only after trial. Therefore, unless the jurisdiction is willing to
appoint counsel for all indigent misdemeanants, some pretrial predictive
analysis will be necessary to determine the likelihood of imprisonment upon
conviction."6 As a practical matter, the application of a pretrial predictive
procedure would be difficult because of the large number of misdemeanor
cases6 7 and the customarily brief period between a misdmeanor arrest and
trial. Consequently, the court will have little opportunity to evaluate the
likelihood of imprisonment in each case involving an indigent misdemean-
tions for minor ones. This suggests the importance of using the processes of
the law at the level of minor offenses to try to prevent recidivism and reverse
the tendency of petty criminality to lead to aggravated forms of antisocial con-
duct. Providing counsel at the lower levels may counter to some degree the
pressure to mass-produce justice and in this and other ways serve the ends of
rehabilitation.
ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELAT-
ING TO PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES 39 (1968) [hereinafter cited as ABA PROJECT].
63. 407 U.S. at 37.
64. Revocation of a driver's license is subject to the requirements of procedural
due process. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1970).
65. See notes 44-49 and accompanying text supra.
66. The ABA suggested that appointment of counsel be based on a pretrialdetermination as to the likelihood of imprisonment on conviction. ABA PROJECT,
supra note 62, at 38. The Argersinger rule is superior to that suggested by the ABA
because it protects defendants who are "unexpectedly" sentenced to imprisonment.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 24, Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S.
25 (1972).
67. See note 55 supra.
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ant.A However, no matter how hasty the evaluation, if counsel is not
appointed, imprisonment is foreclosed as a possible punishment. Moreover,
retrial with an attorney solely for the purpose of allowing a sentence of
imprisonment would arguably, as Justice Powell suggested, be violative of
the prohibition against double jeopardy.69
In making an evaluation as to the impact of the Argersinger rule,
perhaps the only certainty is that the various governmental units will be
forced to allocate additional funds to finance their criminal justice systems.
One possible consequence of this increased cost could be an acceleration
of the trend to remove certain types of conduct, such as drunkenness,
from the criminal area entirely. 70 Another possible result could be that
some court systems which presently meet their indigent representation
requirements by appointment of private attorneys will adopt a public de-
fender system, which is generally less expensive and more efficient when a
large caseload is involved.71
Whether there will be a further extension of the right to counsel is,
of course, a matter of speculation. However, it should be noted that
Argersinger is merely the latest in a series of cases which have extended
that right.72 Moreover, while the opinions in Argersinger obviously re-
flect a difference in viewpoint on the extent to which the Constitution
requires appointment of counsel, there seems to be basic agreement with
Justice Powell's statement that:
The goal should be . . . to expand as rapidly as practicable the
availability of counsel so that no person accused of crime must stand
alone if counsel is needed.7 3
William I. Lehane
68. In attempting to avoid such problems, some courts may choose to set up two
"classes" of misdemeanors - "imprisonable" and "nonimprisonable." Representation
will be afforded only to those indigents accused of "imprisonable" offenses and those
found guilty of any other misdemeanors will not be imprisoned even though that
punishment would be proper in the particular case. While this approach obviously
comports with the rule in Argersinger, it would represent a judicial nullification of
the legislative power to prescribe the range of punishment for a given misdemeanor.
See 407 U.S. at 53.
69. Id. at 54, citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969); Callan v.
Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1885).
70. 407 U.S. at 38 n.9. See generally R. NIMMER, Two MILLION UNNECESSARY
ARRESTS (1971).
71. For an analysis of each system and a comparison of the two, see L. SILVER-
STEIN, supra note 10, at 15-74.
72. See notes 7-32 and accompanying text supra.
73. 407 U.S. at 66.
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